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STATE REGULATION OF MOTOR
CARRIERS
H.

N

WILLIAM IHRIG

O

consideration will be given herein to those practical aspects of
the exercise of legislative power and administrative discretion
relating to motor vehicles arising out of the varying reactions to them
among competitors for the same passenger and cargo traffic. Nor will
the aspect of legislative enactment of regulation as restricting competition and tending to monopolistic grants for the carriage of cargo and
persons be discussed. With this limitation also will be omitted consideration of the protecting of property values of pre-existing carriers
encompassed by a restriction of competition. Neither will any discussion be here directed to the fact that the power to tax may be challenged as often actually approximating the power to destroy. These are
all considerations, which in the impersonality of legislative enactment,
are discharged as unworthy of the attention of the courts in determining the power of the legislature in its benign wisdom to legislate respecting the matters of state regulation of motor vehicles hauling for
hire. These matters, like the echoes from Tara's harps, will be left to
the memory of Legislative Halls.'
1

But see South & N. A. R. Co. v. Railroad Canmission, 171 Fed. 225 (C. C.
N. D. Ala. 1909), -where the court held that in a bill to enjoin the enforcement of railroad rates established by a state, allegations of the motive of the
officers or legislators of the state in prescribing and enacting the statute complained of are impertinent: but that allegations that power conferred by such
statute on a railroad commission to alter the rates fixed thereby in its discretion with respect to individual carriers is being so used as to discriminate
against complainants and to favor other carriers as a reward for dismissing
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The aspects herein considered are those which generally arise in a
critical approach to such regulations-in a consideration of the first
principles in this growing field of legislation affecting thousands in
every state. Regulation as to any particular situation or motor vehicle
must be considered from the standpoint of whether the regulation
emanates from a local, state,,.or national legislative body. In each instance the authority and limitation thereon vary in handling the selfsame problem both as to the regulation standpoint and that of taxation. In the absence of legislation preventing the use of public highways
by motor carriers such carriers are lawful vehicles and have an equal
right with carriers drawn by horses and other lawful conveyances to
operate on public highways upon compliance with local police regula2
tions.
State regulation of motor vehicles for hire is based on the exercise
of the inherent police power vested in the respective state legislative
bodies to regulate motor vehicle transportation on the highways.3 In
different jurisdictions the legislatures have declared various reasons for
the exercise of the police power in this regard, among those being that
the primary purpose of such legislation is: (1) to secure the adequacy
of service by such carriers; (2) to secure the reasonableness of rates;
(3) to protect the business of others in such business by controlling
competitive conditions; (4) to regulate the public highways either for
their protection or conservation; (5) to serve the public interest and
convenience on the public highways; (6) to safeguard the pavement,
the pedestrians and the other travelers on it.
Due process clauses limiting state legislative bodies are not violated
by reasonable classifications among motor vehicles as to types. But the
right to use the public highways of the state by the usual and ordinary
means of transportation is common to all members of the publicwithout distinction. However, in classification of motor vehicles and
their operators the operation of them for hire on the public highways
is a special use of such highways which tends to impede ordinary traffic
and require additional construction, maintenance, and repairs of the
highways at public expense thus furnishing additional reasons for such
classification and for their regulation and control.
suits brought to test the validity of the law, are pertinent to show that the
statute, in operation, denies to complainants the equal protection of the laws,
citing Covington & Lexington T. R. Co. v. Sanford, 164 U.S. 578. 17 Sup.
Ct. 198, 41 L.ed. 560 (1896), and also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 63
Sup. Ct. 1064, 30 L.ed. 220 (1886), relating to "actual operation" of administrative bodies.
2 Chicago Motor Coach Co. v. Chicago, 337 Ill. 200, 169 N.E. 22, P. U. R. 1930
B 178 (1929); Ovmaha & C. B. Street R. Co. v. Omaha, 114 Neb. 483, 208
N.W. 123, P. U. R. 1926 D. 629 (1926).
3 P. U. R. 1922 E. 447. Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 52 Sup Ct. 581, 76
L.ed. 1167 (1932).
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Before legislation enacted is declared unconstitutional as an exercise of the police power mentioned above it must appear that the
specific exercise of such power is flagrantly unjust, unreasonable, or
oppressive. A study of the cases must always relate to the particular
statutes under consideration. It is important to observe the distinction
in the statutes and the decisions under them with respect to the type of
motor carrier regulated in the particular instance. At common law the
regulations for a common carrier were based on such carrier's "hauling
for hire to an unlimited public." Included in such class were those who
had a definite route of service more or less scheduled, as well as those
who went anywhere at any time.
Modem regulation in some states attempts to include all these
classes under the designation "common carrier." Then those carriers
who offer little direct competition or who are politically troublesome
are designated "contract carriers" and subjected to little regulation and
with numerous classes of tax exemptions provided for them with major
emphasis on penalties for them only if they encroach on the traffic
of the more closely regulated "common carriers." In other states a
well defined delineation has arisen both as to the elements of regulation as well as taxation. A "common carrier" has by those states been
defined as one traveling between fixed termini over a regular or irregular route. A "contract carrier" has been defined by these states as all
carriers hauling for hire not included in the definition of a "common
carrier." In most of these states a private carrier is one who does not
haul for hire and usually owns the subject of carriage.
An examination of the complete set of definitions in the law relating
to motor carriers of persons or property is necessary to understand the
limits of the language employed in the respective cases and it will be
found that most distinctions in construction of regulation and tax laws
relating to motor carriers are based on dissimilar facts rather than on
dissimilar names for the carriers.

PUBLIC INTEREST AS THE BASIS FOR REGULATION

Because Motor Carriers are usually regulated by Railroad or Public Service Commissions does not mean ipso facto that such regulated
motor carriers are assumed to be "public utilities" in the full legal
sense of the name. Rather the "public interest" in their business and in
the highways on which they travel is the basis for legislative regulations of such carriers.
Motor carriers of all classes may be included in a general law to
regulate the different classifications thereof on the proper basis but the
regulati6n must be related to the facts of the particular classification
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in measuring the regulations applied to the individual groups of motor
carriers.4
Regarding the factor of "public interest" it is measured by the
established rules.5 In Wisconsin we find public utilities defined by stat4Gruber v. Commonwealth, 140 Va. 312, 125, S.E. 427. P. U. R. 1925 C.
(1924); Weaver v. Public Service Conmission, 40 Wyo. 462, 278 Pac.
(1929); Haddad v. State, 23 Ariz. 105, 201 Pac. 847, P. U. R. 1922 B.
(1921).
In 1927 the Supreme Court, in Tyson & Brother v. Banton, infra, said:
"This phrase (affected with a public interest), first used by Lord Hale

310
542
124
200

years ago, * * * * , it is true, furnishes at best an indefinite standard, and

attempts to define it have resulted, generally, in producing little more than
paraphrases, which themselves require elucidation. Certain properties and kinds
of business it obviously includes, like common carriers, telegraph and telephone
companies, ferries, wharfage, etc. Beyond these, its application not only has
not been uniform but many of the decisions disclose the members of the same
court in radical disagreement. Its full meaning, like that of many other organizations, cannot be exactly defined ;-it can only be approximated. * * *
"The characterizations in some decisions of business as 'quasi-public'
• * * 'not strictly private' * * * and the like, while well enough for the

purpose for which they were employed, namely, as a basis for upholding
police regulations in respect of the conduct of particular businesses, cannot
be accepted as equivalents for the description 'affected with a public interest,' as that phrase is used in the decisions of this court as the basis for
legislative regulation of prices. The latter power is not only a more definite
and serious invasion of the rights of property and the freedom of contract,
but its exercise cannot always be justified by circumstances which have been
held to justify legislative regulation of the manner in which a business shall
be carried on. * * *

In the Wolff case [Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262
U.S. 522, 67 L.ed. 1103, 43 Sup. Ct. (1923)] this court held invalid the wage fixing prcvision of the compulsory arbitration statute of Kansas as applied to a
meat packing establishment. * * * In the course of the opinion (p. 535) it was
said that businesses characterized as clothed with a public interest might be
divided into three classes:
"(1) Those which are carried on under the authority of P public grant of
privileges which either expressly or impliedly imposes the affirmative duty of
rendering a public service demanded by any ,enember of the public. Such are
the railroads,other coammon carriers and public utilities.
"(2) Certain occupations, regarded as exceptional, the public interest attaching to which, recognized from earliest times, have survived the period of
arbitrary laws by Parliament or colonial legislatures for regulating all trades
and callings. Such are those of the keepers of inns, cabs and gristmills. State
v. Edwards, 86 Me. 102, 29 Atl. 947, 41 Am. St. Rep. 528, 25 L.R.A. 504
(1893); Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Kutz, 241 U.S. 252, 254, 36 Sup. Ct. 583, 60
L.ed. 984, 986; Ann. Cas. 1916 D. 765, P. U. R. 1916 D. 972 (1916).
"(3) Businesses 'which though not public at their inception may be fairly
said to have risen to be such and have become subject in consequence to some
goverrment regulation. They have come to hold such a peculiar relation to
the public that this is superimposed upon them. In the language of the cases,
the owner by devoting his business to the public use, in effect grants the public
an interest in that use and subjects himself to public regulation to the extent of that interest although the property continues to belong to its private
owner and to be entitled to protection accordingly" (citing the Munn case and
others.) Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 430, 47 Sup. Ct. 426,
71 L.ed. 718, 722, 723 (1927). Also see: Munn v. Illinois. 94 U.S. 113, 24
L.ed. 77 (1876) (elevator charge; Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 48 Sup. Ct.
545, 72 L.ed. 913 (1928) (employment agency rates); Frost v. Corp. Corl"
278 U.S. 515, 49 Sup. Ct. 235, 73 L.ed. 483 (1929) (cotton gin case); New
State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 52 Sup. Ct. 541, 76 L.ed. 747 (1932)
(ice case) ; Cotting v. K. C. Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79, 85, 22 Sup. Ct. 30,
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ute in Section 196.01. Construing that section the Wisconsin Supreme
Court stated:
"The question whether a corporation such as is the canal company
is or is not a public utility in this state is one to be ultimately determined by the judiciary by applying the statutory definition of a public
utility to the facts concerning and the physical situation of any such
company.

8

Considerations of promoting the public interest by preventing waste
from duplication of services may be considered in determining the
validity of regulatory legislation. Matters of policy of this type are left
to the legislature by the courts. 7 The use of the distinguishing name
of "perMits, licenses and certificates of convenience and necessity" for
classes of motor carriers indicates a legislative recognition of variance
in the extent of the public interest in the various types of the motor
carrier business. The cases divide on the different basic factors in the
actual business of the various motor carriers on the well known principle that one cannot be compelled to conduct a business different than
he desires except as an incident to a voluntary act on his part."
The United States Supreme Court has held that a state statute converting property used exclusively in the business of a private carrier
at common law into a public utility or making the owner a public carrier takes private property for public use without just compensation in
violation of the due process clauses of the 14th Amendment.9 Using
as the basis for classification the weight of motor vehicles is proper
under the police power. 10 But to exempt motor carriers from regula46 L.ed. 92, 99 (1901) (stock yard charges) ; Ratcliff v. Wichita Union Stock
I'ards Co., 74 Kan. 863, 8 Pac. 150, 6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 835 (1906) and cases
cited in footnote (stock yard rates) ; see Conway, et al. v. Taylor's Executor,
1 BLACK 603, 633, 17 L.ed. 191, 202, 203 (1862) (ferry privileges legal);
Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 11 Sup. Ct. 13, 34 L.ed. 620 (1890) (limiting number of licenses, also see Guernsey, Regulation of Public Utilities
(1928) 13 M1ARQ. L. REv. 25.
8 Wisconsin Tract. etc. Co. v. Green Bay etc. Canal Co., 188 Wis. 54, 205 N.W.
551, 554 (1925).
7 See"footnote to dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in New State Ice Co. v.
Liebermann, 285 U.S. 262, 52 Sup. Ct. 571, 76 L.ed. 747 (1932) reading: "See
D. E. Lilienthal and 1. S. Rosenbaum, Motor CarrierRegulation by Certificates of Necessity and Convenience (1926) 36 YALE L. J. 163; I. S. Rosenbaum
and D. E. Lilienthal, Motor CarrierRegulation: Federal,State and Municipal
(1926) 26 COL. L. REv. 954. Compare La Rue Brown and S. N. Scott, Regulation of Contract Motor Carrier Under the Constitution (1931) 44 HARv. L.
REv. 530"
8 See note 7 supra. Also see: Notes in P. U. B. 1927 E. 90; P. U. R. 1928 B. 261;
and P. U. R. 1932 A. 257.
9
Michigan Public Util. Coin. v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570, 45 Sup. Ct. 191, 69 Led.
445, 36 A.L.R. 1105, P.U.R. 1925 C. 231 (1925); also see Frost v. Col. R.
Co., 271 U.S. 583, 46 Sup. Ct. 605, 70 L.ed. 1101, 47 A.L.R. 457, P. U. R.
1926 D 483 (1926), and Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 51 Sup. Ct. 582, 75
L.ed. 1264, P. U. R. 1931 C 448 (1931).
10 Sproles v.Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 52 Sup. Ct. 581, 76 L.ed. 1167, P. U. R. 1932
E. 157 (1932).
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tion on the basis of the type of property carried is unconstitutional."
To classify motor carriers for the purpose of regulation on the basis
of operation within a limited area or because the carriage is for the
owner rather than for hire is constitutional.' 2
Regarding the limits of regulation of enterprises "affected with a
public interest" the Supreme Court in Cotting v. Kansas City Stock
Yards Co. 3 put the question as follows:
"But to what extent may this regulation go? Is there no limit beyond which the state may not interfere with the charges for service
either of those who are engaged in performing some public service,
or of those who, while not engaged in such service, have yet devoted
their property to a use in which the public has an interest? And is the
extent of governmental regulation the same in both of these classes of
cases? After analyzing the leading decisions the Supreme Court
concluded:
"In the light of these quotations, this may be affirmed to be the
present scope of the decisions of this court in respect to the power of
the legislature in regulating rates: As to those ihdividuals and-corporations who have devoted their property to a use in which the public
has an interest, although not engaged in a work of a confessedly public
character, there has been no further ruling than that the state may
prescribe and enforce reasonable charges. What shall be the test of
4
reasonableness in those charges is absolutely undisclosed."'
DISTINCTION BETWEEN

CARRIAGE

FOR HIRE AT COMMON LAW AND

UNDER PRESENT STATUTES

At common law there were private and common carriers: Corpus
Juris defines a private carrier:
"A private carrier is one who, without being engaged in the business
of carrying as a public employment, undertakes to deliver goods in a
particular case for hire or reward. He may carry or not, as he deems
best. He is but a private individual and is invested, like all other private
persons, with a right to make his own contracts."'" Corpus Juris also
defines a common carrier:
"A common carrier has been defined as 'one who undertakes for
hire or reward, to transport the goods of such as chose to employ him
from place to place.' This definition applies to carriers by land and by
"Snith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 51 Sup. Ct. 581, 75 L.ed. 1264 (1931). But see
Schwartzman ServAce, Ic. v. Stahl, 60 F. (2d) 1034 (W. D. Mo. 1932).
12 Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352, 52 Sup Ct. 595, 76 L.ed.
1155 (1932).
13 183 U.S. 79, 85, 22 Sup. Ct. 30, 46 L.ed. 92 (1901).
'4 Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79, 91, 22 Sup. Ct. 30, 46
L.ed. 92 (1901).
"s 10 C. J. § 4. (See cases cited in notes on carriers.)
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water, without regard to distance or motive power. It is a question of
law for the court to determine what constitutes a common carrier; but
it is a question of fact whether one charged as a common carrier is
within that definition and is carrying on its business in that capacity."1
While the development of state regulation of motor carriers has
been of recent date compared with railroad regulation it has been
materially influenced by the decisions applicable to them as well as by
the decisions concerning regulation of river ferries and wharfage companies.17 The Supreme Court has held in connection with private carriers and common carriers that a statute purporting to regulate motor
carriers which fails to distinguish between a private carrier and a
common carrier is unconstitutional as applied to a private carrier engaged in hauling merchandise under an exclusive contract with a
single shipper. 18 In making provisions applicable only to common carriers also applicable to private carriers by means of regulatory devices,
a constitutional power is usurped to obtain an unconstitutional result.'9
However, classification may be made between common carriers at common law and private carriers at common law operating for hire and
private carriers at common law who carry only their own goods, "since
there is a natural and inherent basis for the classification and distinc20
tion."
DIFFERENCE IN

REGULATION BASED ON INTRASTATE AND INTERSTATE

NATURE OF MOTOR CARRIAGE

The division of legislative powers between Congress and the state
legislatures is "twofold. The source of authority in Congress is not the
police power as in the case of state legislatures, but is rather the commerce clause of the Constitution. The due process limitations are applicable to both federal and state legislation arising from the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments respectively. This fact of state limitation by
the Federal Constitution of course gives a basis for federal review of

state legislation and administrative regulation and orders.
If the respective adjoining states of the Union had similar provisions for the regulation and taxation of motor vehicles, state regulation
16 10
17.p.

C. J. § 9. (See cases cited in notes on carriers.)
U. I. 1928 B. 444: P. U. R. 1922 A. 615; P. U. R. 1930 A. 115"

i1 Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 51 Sup. Ct. 582, 75 L.ed. 1264 (1931) ; Frost
V. Cal. R. Corn., 271 U.S. 583, 46 Sup. Ct. 605, 70 L.ed. 1101, 47 A.L.R. 457
(1926) ; Michigan Pub. Util. Com. v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570, 45 Sup. Ct. 191, 69
L.ed. 445, 36 A.L.R. 1105 (1925). But see Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S.
251, 53 Sup. Ct. 181, 77 L.ed. 288 (1932) ; Sclfwartzman Service, Inc. v. Stahl,
et al., 60 F. (2d) 1034 (W, D. Mo. 1932). Also see Weaver v. Pub. Serv.
Com., 40 Wyo. 462, 278 Pac. 542 (1929) ; Motor Freightv. Pub. Util. Corn., 120
Ohio St. 1, 165 N.E. 355 (1929).
9
1 Mcintyre v. Harrison, 172 Ga. 65, 157 S.E. 499, P. U. R. 1931 C. 401 (1931).
20 Holmes v. R. R. Com., 197 Cal. 624, 242 Pac. 486, P. U. R. 1926 C. 664 (1925).
Also see notes in 81 A.L.R. 1415, 87 A.L.R. 735.
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would be more effective and productive of the declared legislative intent indicated for the various motor carrier acts in spite of the failure of Congress to legislate for motor vehicles under its interstate
commerce powers and in spite of the limits this unexercised power
places on state regulatory effort. In the absence of similar regulatory
and tax laws by adjoining states all state highways between such adjoining states with unequal laws offer daily scenes of cargo bootlegging,
of severe political pressure on enforcement officers, and injustice on
those motor carriers who accept the burden of full regulation and taxation but who get the benefits of unequal enforcement. From this unequal "reciprocity law" provision on the part of adjoining states, a
"gordion knot" for administrative officers as well as prejudiced motor
carriers is presented.
Within the state there may be at various times both local and state
legislative provisions as to the same or different classes of motor
vehicles 21 and in all such legislation the cardinal questions of whether
such legislation is under the police or regulatory power or under the
taxing power must be first considered. This matter once being determined, the sources and limitation of the legislative authority exercised
can be definitely studied and the proper authorities considered.
As a rule local legislation is superseded by state legislation either
of general application or of the sort that is based on a proper classification. 22 With the development of home rule constitutional provisions
in the various states especial consideration must be given to the form
of such limitations on the state legislatures and as grants of authority
23
to local legislative bodies dealing with local matters.
As the problems of motor carriers became more pressing, legislation on the subject passed in the main out of the field of local control.
The problem in turn became one of the local communities striving to
obtain some of the state-collected fees and taxes imposed along with
state legislation, to reimburse themselves for the maintenance of their
roads. The major aspect left to the local bodies was a right to consent
or object to the routes used by motor carriers having regular routes
either as to busses or trucks through such communities. This may be
quite an effective means of control of the use of the city streets and
determination as to who shall obtain that city's passenger and cargo
traffic when so intentionally used by the local authorities.
Note on conflict between statutes and local regulations as to autos for hire:
21 A.L.R. 1203; 64 A.L.R. 993.
22 McQuillan, Law of Municipal Corporations (2nd Ed.) § 214 et seq.; also see
Re Miller, P. U. R. 1927 A. 626; Desser v. Wichita, 96 Kan. 820, 153 Pac. 1194,
L.R.A. 1916 D. 246 (1916).
23 Home rule constitutional amendment, WIs. CONST. Art. II, § 3; State ex rel.
Sleeman v. Baxter, 195 Wis. 437, 219 N.W. 858 (1928); Milwaukee v. Diller,
194 Wis. 376, 216 N.W. 834 (1927).
21
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REGULATION VERSUS TAXATION

As mentioned previously legislation either state or local pertaining
to motor carriers arises both out of the police or regulatory power and
out of the taxing power. In Wisconsin, for example, the taxing provisions with matters of rates thereof, returns, exemptions therefrom,
and penalties are found in Section 76.54 of the Wisconsin Statutes as
to ton-mileage taxes and the optional flat taxes payable in lieu thereof,
in Chapter 78 as to motor fuel taxes, Sections 85.01 to 85.05 as to registration fees, while the regulatory or police power provisions are found
in Sections 85.86 to 85.92 and in Chapter 194 as well as in many other
special provisions.
Observance of the fact that taxation may be on the basis of a license
tax2 or on an occupational basis 25 and that regulation may be accompanied by licensing for which fees are imposed both as to license and
as to the vehicles used thereunder is essential to properly understand
the particular situation of regulation or taxation of motor carriers under consideration. The principle is concisely stated as follows:
"The imposition of such a tax (for vehicles) may be referable to
the taxing power, the police power or both; to the police power alone
if the object is merely to regulate, and the amount received merely
pays the expense of enforcing the regulations, and to the taxing power
alone if its main object is revenue. Whether the fee in a given case is
to be regarded as imposed for regulation or revenue will depend upon
the recitals of the ordinances (or statute) and to proper construc26
tion."
Regulations that in effect" determine operating practices must not
be unreasonable and must proximate the aims to be accomplished by
them. Among those provisions which have come to be well recognized
as reasonable are those requiring the use of bills of lading by motor
carriers ;27 that the motor vehicles used by the carrier should be owned
by it ;28 that motor vehicles be equipped with fire extinguishers and
first aid kits ;29 that vehicles of not more than certain maximum limits
be used ;30 that require a showing of financial responsibility before the
granting of consent to operate as a motor carrier ;31 that as a prerequisite to operation of a motor vehicle sufficient public liability insurance
24 McQuillan, Law of Municipal Corporation (2nd Ed.) § 1110 et seq.; Cooley,
Law of Taxation (4th Ed.) §§ 1801, 1202.
-2 Cooley,

Law of Taxation (4th Ed.) §§ 1695, 1702. See Ihrig, Occupational Taxes (1932) 17 MARQ. L. REv. 19.
20 McQuillan, Law of Municipal Corporations (2nd Ed.) §§ 1110, 1091.
27 Re Auto Transp. Companies P. U. R. 1930 C. 54 (Wis.).
28
North Ohio T. & L. Co. v. Public Util. Con., 113 Ohio 93, 148 N.E. 584 (1925).
29Re Motor Passenger Vehicles P. IT.R. 1927 B. 589 (Mich.).
30 Ex parte Cardinal,170 Cal. 519, 150 Pac. 348, L.R.A. 1915 F. 850 (1915).
31

Capitol Taxicab Co. v. Cerntak, 60 F. (2d) 608 (N.D. Ill. 1932).
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and cargo and passenger insurance be obtained ;32 that the vehicle operate over only special roads 3 3-and such limitation may be complete and
amount to exclusion from the public highways ;" that vehicle operators
should not loaf or smoke while having passengers ;35 that such motor
carriers file annual and other reports as well as a classification of their
rates, fares, and charges.36
All regulations provided for the various motor carriers must be reasonably designed to accomplish the due aim of proper regulative ends
and such regulation may not be arbitrary or capricious, 37 nor may such
regulations tend to create a monopoly or require the carrier to change
his status in violation of the due process clause of the 14th Amendment.38
Rules have been promulgated and continued, regulating the filing
of motor carrier rates and the classification and sale of tickets; as well
as rules as to equipment of motor vehicles used as common carriers
including lights, tires, brakes, skid chains, speedometers, and warning
devices; such rules have also been extended to common carriers to
include maintenance, safety, overcrowding, carrying of loads on running boards; and with respect to trailers.39
Such rules have been extended to classes of transportation, rebates,
service, payment of commissions, change of control or ownership, noncarriage of explosives and inflammable articles, overcrowding, and lim40
itation of carriage of baggage by common carriers of persons.
RATE FIXING
It is impossible to discuss the matter of regulation without mentioning rate fixing. This is a subject which requires more consideration
than is possible in the space of a few pages. The principles can be
32

Sprout v. So. Bend, 277 U.S. 163, 48 Sup. Ct. 502, 72 L.ed. 833 (1928) ; Cont.
Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352, 52 Sup. Ct. 595, 76 L.ed. 1155 (1932) ;
Hodge D. Co. v. Cincinnati,284 U.S. 335, 52 Sup. Ct. 144, 76 L.ed. 323 (1932).
33Red Star D. Assn. v. Detroit, 234 Mich. 398, 208 N.W. 602 (1926); Decker v.
Wichita, 109 Kan. 796, 202 Pac. 89 (1921) ; Re American Coach Lines, P. U. R.
1927 B. 62; Ex parte Dickey, 76 W. Va. 576, 85 S.E. 781, L.R.A. 1915 F. 840

(1915).

C. Auto. Freight v. Pub. Util. Com., 51 Idaho 56, 1 P. (2nd) 627 (1931).
33
36 Re Grieley Transp. Co., P.U.R. 1929 C. 106.
Re TransportationCo., P. U. R. 1918 B. 297.
37 Interstate Transit Co. v. Derr, 71 Mont. 222, 228 Pac. 624 (1924) ; Fla. Motor
38 Lines v. State R. Com., 101 Fla. 1018, 132 So. 851 (1931).
Pub. Serv. Corn. v. Saye & Davis Transfer Co., 170 Ga. 873, 154 S.E. 439
(1930); Frost v. Calif. R. Cont., 271 U.S. 583, 46 Sup. Ct. 605, 70 L.ed. 1101,
47 A.L.R. 457 (1926); Covington & Lexington T. R. Co. v. Sanford, 164 U.S.
3

578, 17 Sup. Ct. 198, 41 L.ed. 560 (1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,

6 Sup. Ct. 1064, 30 L.ed. 220 (1886) ; South & N. A. R. Co. v. Railroad Com.,

171 Fed. 225 (C. C. N. D. Ala. 1909).

39P. U. R. 1918 B. 314-319 (Cal.) P. U. R. 1923 E. 793 (Mass.); P. U. R.
1927 E. 491 (Neb.); P. U. R. 1927 E. 496, 500.
40 p. U. R. 1919 A. 52 (Ariz.).
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merely touched."' It has been said by the U. S. Supreme Court that:
"* * * the right of the owner to fix a price at which his property
shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself,
State Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall 232, 278, 21 L.ed. 146, 162 (1872),
and, as such, within the protection of the due process of law clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. * * * The power to regulate
property, services or business can be invoked only under special circumstances; and it does not follow that because the power may exist to
regulate in some particulars it exists to regulate in others or in all.
"The authority to regulate the conduct of a business or to require
a license comes from a branch of the police power and which may be
quite distinct from the power to fix prices. The latter, ordinarily, does
not exist in respect of merely private property or business, Chesapeake & P. Teleph. Co. v. Manning, 186 U.S. 238, 246, 22 Sup. Ct.
881, 46 L.ed. 1144, 1147 (1902), but exists only where the business
or the property involved has become affected with a public interest.' ""
The "due process clause" is not violated in the fixing of reasonable
rates for motor carriers.43
As to the limits of rate making the Supreme Court has said:
"It is unnecessary to decide, and we do not wish to be understood
as laying down as an absolute rule, that in every case a failure to produce some profit to those who have invested their money in the building of a road is conclusive that the tariff is unjust and unreasonable.
And yet justice demands that everyone should receive some compensation for the use of his money or property, if it be possible without
prejudice to the rights of others."'"
In Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., the Supreme Court
stated:
"While by the decision heretofore referred to he cannot claim immunity from all state regulation he may rightfully say that such regulation shall not operate to deprive him of the ordinary privileges of
others engaged in mercantile business.

41 See H. Wrii. Ihrig and Chas. L. Goldberg, Valuation of Public Utilities (1927)
11 MARQ. L. REv. 242.

42 Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 429, 430, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 71 L.ed.
718, 722 (1927) (regulation of theater rates).
43 West v. Western Dairy Co., 150 Md. 641, 135 Atl. 136, P. U. R. 1927 B. 524
(1926); Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 53 Sup. Ct. 181, 77 L.ed. 288,
87 A.L.R. 721 (1932).
44 Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 412, 14 Sup. Ct. 1047,
38 L. ed. 1014 (1894); St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Gill, 156
U.S. 649, 657, 15 Sup. Ct. 484, 39 L.ed. 567 (1895) ; Covington, etc. Turnpike
Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 17 Sup. Ct. 198, 41 L.ed. 560 (1896);
Sinyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546. 547. 18 Sup. Ct. 418, 42 L.ed. 819, 171
U.S. 361, 18 Sup. Ct. 888, 43 L.ed. 897 (1898) ; San Diego Land Co. v. National
City, 174 U.S. 739, 754, 757, 19 Sup. Ct. 804, 43 L.ed. 1154 (1899).
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"Pursuing this thought we add that the state's regulation of his
charges is not to be measured by the aggregate of his profits, determined by the volume of business, but to the question whether any particular charge to an individual dealing with him is, considering the
service rendered, an unreasonable exaction. In other words, if he has
a thousand transactions a day and his charges in each are but a reasonable compensation for the benefit received by the party dealing with
him, such charges do not become unreasonable because by reason of
the multitude the aggregate of his profits is large. The question is not
how much he makes out of his volume of business, but whether in
each particular transaction the charge is an unreasonable exaction for
the services rendered. He has a right to do business. He has a right to
charge for each separate service that which is reasonable compensation
therefor, and the legislature may not deny him such reasonable compensation, and may not interfere simply because out of the multitude
of his transactions the amount of his profits is large. Such was the
rule of the common law even in respect to those engaged in a quasipublic service independent of legislative action. In any action to recover
for an excessive charge, prior to all legislative action, whoever knew
of an inquiry as to the amount of the total profits of the party making
the charge? Was not the inquiry always limited to the particular
charge, and whether that charge was an unreasonable exaction for the
services rendered?
"The authority of the legislature to interfere by a regulation of
rates is not an authority to destroy these principles, but simply to en4 5

force them.1

In considering the matter of fixing rates for motor carriers under
state laws several important matters must be kept in mind. The guiding decisions must relate to statutes and businesses of the same kind.
In rate making case the public interest is protected in some situations
by merely fixing a reasonable charge for the separate services to be
rendered whereas in situations of outright public utilities the rate fixed
also has relation to the ultimate net profits of the company. To apply
the wrong rule might cause the respective rates to be either higher or
lower for motor carriers so as to influence the competitive effectiveness of such carriers. This situation is protected by the freedom of
private contract clause and the due process clause of the federal constitution. It is probable that with the extensive advent of rate making
for motor carriers a new line of federal decisions under the federal
constitution will arise, since the federal courts offer the more direct
remedy in these situations.
45

Cotting v. K. C. Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79, 95-97, 22 Sup. Ct. 30, 46 L.ed.
92 (1901); also see note as to jurisdiction of commission in fixing rates for
motor carriers 1 A.L.R. 1460 and 51 A.L.R. 827.
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The state statute authorizing rate making for motor carriers must
be carefully considered as to whether it applies alike to common and
to contract motor carriers. When the state statute covers both the
maximum and minimum rates for the same type of transportation
service another special problem arises in the accounting basis therefor.
Attempts will be made to have rates fixed for motor carriers of
different and competitive types of service which will have in them
elements of benefiting one type of carrier service over another. To
the extent that such elements may enter legislative efforts in providing
for a unified transportation system or in safeguarding established carrier service it appears that the same can only relate to matters of
regulation and not to. rate matters so that the rate making will have
to relate to a reasonable accounting basis alone therefor.
PRACTICE CONSIDERATIONS

Motor vehicle regulation is of a twofold aspect to the average
practitioner. It is not only the matter of the lawyer-like approach to a
legal problem-the statutes, the appellate decisions, and the manner
and methods of the courts, but there is another and more important
aspect-that of the ever developing field of administrative law--of the
particular commission personnel and peculiar precedents which usually
must be studied at close range for understanding. These difficulties
render local attorneys near the commissions administering the motor
vehicle law in a better position to understand the best method of procedure in the particular case, or what to expect from a given set of
facts in advising clients respecting a given motor vehicle law problem.
Then there is the matter of rules of procedure and of hearings or the
lack of them with the resulting expenditure of time in properly presenting one's client's interest in such an uncharted sea.
It appears reasonable to suggest the retention of local counsel in
handling commission matters, unless one has a regular repetition of
such business-in the interests of economy for one's client. The choice
of local counsel might well be influenced by a personal choice, rather
than by correspondence, to better determine the possibility of conflicting claims of construction before such commissions. This might tend
to arise where the number of local counsel who practiced before such
commission was restricted.
Also definite aspects of administrative law and administrative
bodies must be kept in mind. One finds experts stating: "The action
of the administration, whose forms and methods have just been described, is so important that it is impossible in any country possessing
constitutional government to allow every administrative officer a perfectly free hand in the discharge of his duties.
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"Nearly all the expressions of the will of the state which are to be
carried out in their details and executed by the administration cause
a conflict at times between the conception by the administration of
what the public welfare demands and the conception by the individual
of the sphere of private rights guaranteed to them by the law.
"If the officers of the administration had, in all such cases, uncontrolled discretion, it is to be feared that individual rights would be
violated.
"Of course, it is the purpose of all administrative legislation to
lessen as far as possible the realm of administrative discretion and to
fix limits within which the administration must move. But it is impossible to do this with such precision as effectively to protect private
rights.

'4

6

4"Frank J.Goodnow, Principles of the Administrative Law of the United States,

pp. 367, 368.

